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Canada’s privacy watchdog takes five C-22 fixes to the Senate

The lawful access bill passed the Commons in June with some of Philippe Dufresne's May recommendations written in. On Nov. 2 he told senators what's still missing, starting with how much police can demand from businesses on mere suspicion.

Illustration for the prompt/power story: Canada's privacy watchdog takes five C-22 fixes to the Senate
Illustration: prompt/power

A name and an email address are routine data when they come from your phone company. The same two fields mean something else when police get them from a dating app, a medical clinic or a law firm. Privacy Commissioner Philippe Dufresne made that argument to senators on Monday, Nov. 2, when he asked them to amend Bill C-22 before it becomes law. Depending on the service, he said, such information could carry “a heightened expectation of privacy due to its sensitivity,” according to The Canadian Press.

Abstract spot illustration: a wide fan of faint lines spreads out from one point. A two-part clamp stops all but the three middle lines, which carry on in bright lime to three small nodes. Set over a dark teal-green gradient.
The OPC’s first ask: turn the bill’s open-ended “subscriber information” into a short, finite list, and limit who can be ordered to hand it over. Illustration: prompt/power

The timing is what gives that appearance weight. C-22, the Lawful Access Act, 2026, was introduced on March 12 by Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree. The Commons public safety committee (SECU) amended it, and the House passed it at third reading on June 18. The Senate gave it second reading on Oct. 22 and sent it to the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs. LEGISinfo lists that committee’s first meeting on the bill on Nov. 2, the day both Anandasangaree and Dufresne appeared before senators.

The House is done with it unless the Senate sends back amendments. This committee is the likeliest place for them to start.

This is Dufresne’s third try. He filed a written submission with eight recommendations dated May 21, then testified before SECU on May 26. When SECU moved to clause-by-clause review, Liberal MPs turned down Conservative efforts to bring him back, while RCMP and CSIS officials attended as witnesses. University of Ottawa law professor Michael Geist wrote in June that the process “does not suggest the government is serious about striking that balance.”

Two bills stapled together

Part 1 rewrites police powers in the Criminal Code. It adds a “confirmation of service demand,” which Justice Canada describes as a yes-or-no question to a telecom or internet provider about whether it serves a given person or number. Medical and solicitor-client privileged information is excluded from that demand. Remember that carve-out. Part 1 also creates a new subscriber information production order, and here the bar drops: a judge must find “reasonable grounds to suspect” an offence, lower than the reasonable grounds to believe that the existing general production order requires. The rest of Part 1 covers exigent-circumstances seizures, cross-border data requests and a clause saying police need no order to collect publicly available information.

Part 2 is a new statute, the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act (SAAIA). Under it, cabinet can make regulations, and the public safety minister can issue orders, requiring “electronic service providers” to build and maintain capabilities that help police and CSIS use their access powers. Ministerial orders can last up to two years and are not valid unless the Intelligence Commissioner approves them, under section 7 of the House-passed text.

The House made real changes. The first-reading text let regulations require metadata retention for periods “not exceeding one year.” The version that passed caps it at six months, and it requires each retained category to be “essential for facilitating effective and timely investigations.” Both versions bar retention of content, web browsing history and “a person’s social media activities.” A new clause says the act does not compel providers to decrypt data unless they supplied the encryption themselves. And “systemic vulnerability” now turns on a “credible risk” of unauthorized access instead of a “substantial” one, so more security weaknesses qualify.

In his Senate remarks, Dufresne welcomed a number of the House’s changes, among them stronger judicial oversight in Part 1 and the limit on compelled decryption. Then he went through what’s still missing.

The subscriber information problem

His first ask is about a definition. In proposed section 487.011, “subscriber information” means a name, pseudonym, address, phone number and email, plus account numbers and other provider-assigned identifiers. It also covers the services themselves: the types of services a person uses, the period they used them, and the devices, equipment or things used with them. The new order can be served on “a person who provides services to the public.” That reaches far beyond phone and internet companies.

Dufresne’s view is that a broad definition and a broad set of targets don’t fit a suspicion-level threshold. He wants the definition cut down to a finite list of discrete identifiers, and he wants only telecommunications service providers to be compellable. If the government won’t do either, he has a fallback: copy the medical and privileged-information carve-out the bill already gives the confirmation of service demand.

Our read: the fallback says a lot. Part 1 already has the carve-out Dufresne wants. It just isn’t attached to the order he’s worried about.

Undefined terms, outdated forms

Section 487.0195(4) says police can “receive, obtain and act on any information that is available to the public” without a warrant. The bill doesn’t define that phrase. In May, Dufresne asked for a definition modelled on the Communications Security Establishment Act that leaves out anything a person still reasonably expects to be private. He pointed to data exposed in a breach or published without the person’s knowledge or consent.

The third outstanding item sounds clerical. It isn’t, quite. The House amended section 487.0142 so the issuing judge can specify which information must be produced, but Form 5.0052, the template that must be used for the new order, wasn’t updated to match. As passed, the form still orders production of “all the subscriber information.” Dufresne wants the paperwork brought in line with the law it serves.

Part 2, where the minister holds the pen

Before imposing obligations on providers, cabinet and the minister must consider a list of factors under the SAAIA, including “the potential impact” on “privacy protection and cybersecurity.” Dufresne doesn’t think weighing factors is enough.

“[T]here is no overarching requirement that all obligations imposed under the Act be both necessary and proportionate.”

Philippe Dufresne, Senate committee, Nov. 2, 2026

“I would recommend that necessity and proportionality be made a requirement under the Act,” he told senators.

His last recommendation is new since May. To address the risk that an obligation could weaken a provider’s security, he wants providers to be able to “trigger a pre-emptive, arm’s-length assessment by qualified experts.” He cited similar mechanisms in the UK, Australia and New Zealand. Under the current text, a provider is not required to comply with any part of a regulation or order that would require it to introduce a systemic vulnerability. Who decides whether one would be created? Those sections don’t set out an independent process for that.

Anandasangaree told the same committee that engagement with stakeholders and parliamentarians “did not weaken the bill,” according to The Canadian Press. “It actually made it stronger.”

Clause by clause

The table below compares Dufresne’s eight May 21 recommendations with the bill as it passed the House and with what he told the Senate on Nov. 2. The status column is our comparison of the two documents.

Commissioner’s ask (May 21) Where in C-22 House-passed text Status as of Nov. 2
Narrow “subscriber information” to a finite list of identifiers Cl. 4(2), Criminal Code s. 487.011 Still includes service details and device identifiers Outstanding; repeated to Senate
Limit who can be compelled Cl. 6, s. 487.0142 “A person who provides services to the public” Outstanding; telecoms-only, or a medical/privileged carve-out
Let the judge specify the information; update Form 5.0052 Cl. 6, s. 487.0142(1); Form 5.0052 Section amended; form unchanged Partly met; form fix requested
Define “publicly available” information Cl. 11, s. 487.0195(4) “Available to the public,” undefined Outstanding; repeated to Senate
Make SAAIA obligations necessary and proportionate SAAIA ss. 5(2), 7(1) Factors to consider, including privacy and cybersecurity Outstanding; repeated to Senate
Regulations and orders must not require or preserve systemic vulnerabilities SAAIA ss. 5(5), 7(5) Provider not required to comply in those cases Recast as a call for pre-emptive expert assessment
Widen “systemic vulnerability” to cover weakened authentication or encryption SAAIA s. 2(1) “Credible risk” test; his wording not added; separate no-decryption clause added Partly addressed by the House
Let providers disclose to regulators despite confidentiality rules SAAIA s. 15 New s. 15(2): minister must authorize disclosure to a regulatory authority Partly met, via ministerial authorization rather than an exemption

As of Nov. 12, LEGISinfo shows the bill still at committee consideration in the Senate. As Dufresne pointed out, the text in front of senators would let the new order be served on a dating app. The form that order must be written on still asks for “all the subscriber information.”

// How we reported this

Researched and drafted with AI tools, fact-checked against primary sources and approved by a human editor before publishing. Prices and dates are as of publication. Our standards →

Sources
  1. priv.gc.ca — asked them to amend Bill C-22
  2. cp24.com — "a heightened expectation of privacy due to its sensitivity,"
  3. parl.ca — introduced on March 12
  4. priv.gc.ca — written submission with eight recommendations
  5. priv.gc.ca — testified before SECU
  6. lexblog.com — wrote in June
Contributor, Business & Policy Jeff Cameron

Jeff Cameron writes about the business and policy side of AI for prompt/power. A chief operating officer by trade, he also writes for Not An Atlas.

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